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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MA VIS E. BATT and GARY ALAN
BATT, DOUGLAS LAVERNE
BATT, RONALD AARON BATT
and DANIE JAMES BATT, minors,
by their Guardian ad Litem
BROOKE WELLS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH and JACK
B. PARSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12639

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT THE STATE
OF UTAH

'

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action against the State of Utah and
Parson Construction Company alleging wrongful
death of Charles Batt and his son David Batt, who
were killed in an automobile accident August 26,
1969, on U.S. Highway 89-91, near the Hotsprings
Highway Patrol Station.

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

1

Following a jury
the court entered judg.
ments of no cause of act10n, based upon special in.
terrogatories in which the jury found that:

1. Defendant Jack B. Parson Construction ·
Company was not guilty of negligence.
2. Defendant State of Utah was guilty of negli.'
gence; but that
3. The negligence of the defendant State of
Utah did not proximately cause the accident;
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4. The driver of the Batt vehicle was guilty of ·
contributory negligence; and,
5. The negligence of the driver of the Batt ve· '
hicle proximately contributed to the accident.
There was no issue as to the son's negligence as
the driver, which negligence was imputed to his
father.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State of Utah, one of the defendants-re·
spondents, requests this Court to affirm the judg·
ment of the trial court.
'
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State of Utah does not accept the Statement
of Facts as set forth in Appellants' Brief. Appellants
have failed to relate the facts in the light most favor·
able to the jury's findings, have recited as facts
tain unsupported assumptions they have made ID
support of their theories, and have not fully stated
2

other facts necessary to accurately present the matter to this Court.
On August 26, 1969 at approximately 10 :00
o'clock P.M., Charles Batt and his son, David Batt,
were killed when the north-bound automobile in
which they were riding collided with a south-bound
vehicle driven by Arnold Grundvig, Jr., on Highway
89-91 north of Ogden, near the Hot Springs Highway
Patrol Checking Station (R. 13-14, 331-332). The
stretch of highway upon which the collision occurred
had recently been resurfaced with asphalt by defendant Parson Construction Company under a contract
with the State of Utah (R. 526). At the time of the
accident, a white "skip-line" dividing the two south
bound lanes of traffic, was painted on the highway
in the area of the accident scene. The remainder of
the striping had not been completed (R. 502). Plaintiffs' witness, Alton Hoffman, Jr., foreman for Jack
B. Parson Construction Company, testified that two
signs were installed south of the construction project
informing motorists that construction on the stretch
of highway in question was in progress (R. 503, Ex.
P. 39).
The accident occurred approximately 1550 feet
north of the Highway Patrol Station (R. 723, P-39).
The Station area, was illuminated for a distance of
approximately 500 feet north of the Station (R. 224,
722-724, Exs. P-73, P-39). The single "skip-line" extended into and through the lighted area (Ex. P-39).
Because the appellants have inserted arguments
in their "Statement of Facts," the State of Utah considers it necessary to make some necessary comments
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concerning a few of these statements, in order to
keep the record straight.
Attention is drawn to a comment contained on
page 3 of Appellants' Brief to the effect that,
"The driver ?f
Batt vehicle obviously
.
mterpreted the sk1p-lme as the center line."
This statement is pure speculation and without
evidentiary support. Both occupants of the Batt vehicle were killed in the collision. The fact that the
jury found that the contributory negligence of the
driver of the Batt vehicle was the proximate cause
of the accident and not the negligence of the State of
Utah, supports a presumption to the contrary.
The appellants' conclusionary comments at page
4 of their brief concerning the procedures of resurfacing and painting the white skip-line on the highway, are also improperly included as a Statement of
Fact. Whether such methods were "hazardous, and
contrary to established practice, . . . (and) the rules
and regulations ... " , were questions properly re·
served for the jury. Without prolonging this brief to
review the evidence in this connection, it is sufficient
to point out that the jury found that the procedures
and acts of the State of Utah, whatever they were
found to be, did not proximately cause the accident
(R. 239).
Also, Appellants, at page 4 of their Brief, repre·
sent that the " ... thrust of the defense was that the
proximate cause of the accident was the speed of the
decedent driver. . . . "
The State of Utah claimed, and proved to the
satisfaction of the jury, several acts of contributory
negligence on the part of the driver of the death ve·
4

hicle. These claims were set forth in the court's Instruction No. 23 ( R. 140). The Court defined the
duty of the driver of the Batt vehicle, in part as
follows:
(a) to drive upon the right one-half of the road,
(except under certain conditions described
by the court) .
( b) To use reasonable care and to keep a lookout for other vehicles.
( c) To keep his car under reasonably safe and
proper control.
( d) Not to attempt to pass another vehicle until
he made observations and ascertained that
it could be done with reasonable safety.
( e) Not to follow another vehicle more closely
than was reasonable and prudent under all
the circumstances (R. 140).
The Court's Instruction No. 25, advised the jury
of the duty of the plaintiff driver concerning speed
(R. 142).
The spectrum of defendant's claims of contributory negligence was much broader than the allegation of speed, as suggested by plaintiffs.
The special jury verdict, in effect, found that
the plaintiffs' driver was guilty of contributory negligence which was the sole proximate cause of the
accident ( R. 239-240).
Beginning at page 7 of their brief, Appellants,
undertake to abstract the testimony of the witnesses. However, because their testimony is not reviewed in the light most favorable to the defendants,
5

and some of the statements are inaccurate or incomplete, it is necessary to review the testimony of the
principal witnesses in some depth.
(a) Van Dell Henderson:

Mr. Henderson was the only eye-witness to the
events immediately preceding the accident. He was
driving a 1967 Oldsmobile proceeding north in the
same direction as the Batt vehicle was travelling. He
passed the Batt vehicle near the weigh station. The
Batt car was then in the right hand lane of travel
(R. 305). After passing, Mr. Henderson moved into
proper position on the right-hand side of the newly
surfaced highway ( R. 293). He next observed the
Batt vehicle at or just north of the weigh station
when the Batt car came "along side," "abreast of one
another," in an apparent effort to pass ( R. 294, 308,
309, 315). He observed the Batt vehicle "drifting"
or "swerving" to its right toward the Henderson
automobile ( R. 294, 295, 310). Henderson testified
on cross-examination that he was traveling 45-50
miles per hour as he went through the weigh station
area ( R. 314). He observed the driver of the Batt car
and assumed that he was awake, but didn't know for
sure (R. 316). Because he didn't want the Batt car
"to keep coming towards me" ( R. 311), and in order
to avoid a possible collision, he accelerated and pulled
away at a speed which may have been faster than 50
miles per hour ( R. 304, 315-316). Henderson last ob·
served the plaintiff vehicle still moving to its right,
and it never corrected that movement as far as Hen·
derson observed ( R. 320). He glanced in his rear·
view mirror, and saw a cloud of dust and the impact
with the southbound Grundvig vehicle.
6

(b) Virginia Macavinta:

Mrs. Macavinta was called as a witness by the
plaintiffs. She lived on the east side of the highway
near the scene of the accident. She had driven to
Brigham City earlier the same evening. However, she
did not follow "the same route" as suggested in Appellants' Brief (Appellant's Brief page 7). The Batt
vehicle approached the scene of the accident from the
south, and not from the north.
( c) Allen Gines:
The plaintiffs called Mr. Gines, the investigating highway patrolman, as one of their witnesses. At
the time of the trial he was employed as a police officer for Logan City.
He observed tire marks on the roadway which
he attributed to both the north-bound Batt vehicle,
and the south-bound Grundvig vehicle (R. 334, Exhibit 39). The Batt vehicle left four distinct tire
marks in a northerly arcing fashion. The tire marks
left by the Batt vehicle were not skid marks as would
be left by "locked-up brakes" skidding on the surface,
but in his opinion, resulted from a swerving movement by "turning the wheel severely" (R. 339, 396,
399). The tire marks left by the Batt vehicle were
continuous from their point of beginning to the point
of impact ( R. 396, 399). The tire marks left by the
Batt vehicle indicated the vehicle was in a four-wheel
drift motion proceeding somewhat sideways, as he illustrated by using a diagram ( R. 421, 424 Exhibits
71-72). He believed the tire marks to be "critical
curve marks," which he explained in detail ( R. 429430).
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During the course of the investigation he and
the other police officers located a tire mark off the
right (east) side of the pavement on the soft dirt
shoulder, which "lined up" with the tire marks left
by the Batt car, and appeared to be an extension of
those tire marks (R. 415-416). See plaintiffs' Exhibit 39 where the tire mark is identified by a point
marked "X" just south of another point identified
as "A-2".
He also stated that there was an observable difference in coloration between the road shoulder and
the pavement of the highway. Additionally, a white
fence was also discernable to north-bound traffic on
the right side of the highway in the vicinity of the
accident (R. 437-438, Ex. P. 4).
( d) William P. Rigby.

Mr. Rigby, a farmer and truck driver, who
passed through the area shortly after the accident
occurred, was called as a witness on behalf of the
plaintiffs. Red lights were flashing and the situation
was confusing because it looked like a mass of cars
going each way ( R. 342) . He took the precaution to
drive under the posted speed limit of 40 miles per
hour (R. 346, Ex. P. 39). Cars were parked on either
side of the shoulder of the road ( R. 355). After
threading his way through the confusion of stopping
cars, he pulled around the accident scene and stopped.
All the events recited by Mr. Rigby occurred after
the accident.
(e) Arnold Grundvig, Jr.

Mr. Grundvig was south-bound in a 1967 Ca·
maro, which collided with the north-bound Batt ve·
8

hicle. He remembers little concerning the accident,
except that he saw the other vehicle approaching just
prior to impact (R. 451). The movements of the
Grundvig vehicle were, as revealed by the tire marks
on the highway, described by Officer Allen Gines.
(See Ex. P-39).
(f) Paul F. Williams.

Mr. Williams was employed as a weighman at
the Hot Springs Weigh Station. He described an incident which occurred at the weigh station, although
he could not recall whether it was before or after the
accident ( R. 459), where a car proceeding north
passed him on the left when he was preparing to
make a left turn into the checking station (R. 457).
It was night time and the overhead lights surrounding the weigh station were on ( R. 456). He did not
know the reason for the motorist passing him as he
did.
Certainly the incident does not justify the conclusion stated in appellants' brief at page 9, that the
motorist "apparently thought the white line constituted the center line."
( g) Earl Johnson.
Mr. Johnson is a former District Engineer for
the State of Utah and was called as plaintiffs' witness. He did not have supervision over areas of the
State involved in this accident. He had not been employed by the State for some three years, and was
not familiar with the contract documents which governed the project in question. He stated that it was a
desirable procedure to paint a center line first following resurfacing. He admitted that this was the
9

ideal condition and that it could not be maintained
in all circumstances (R. 477, 491). The unavailability of paint crews, the manner in which the longitudinal asphalt seam is placed upon the highway,
and other factors may alter this ideal procedure (R.
477, 492, 496). In such circumstances the engineer
must use his best judgment ( R. 492).
He did not profess to be acquainted with the
project in question, the difficulties encountered in
the laying of the new surface, the traffic control
problem, or the placement of lines on the project.
( h) William L. Smith.

Mr. Smith, the Project Engineer for the State
of Utah on the re-surfacing job, was called as a witness by the plaintiffs. He ordered the placement of
the skip line on the west side of the highway before
the entire paving project was completed to assist
traffic control problems (R. 578). He wanted a skip
line on the west side of the highway before covering
the skip lines on the east side with asphalt (R. 577).
The contractor, Parson Construction Company, pro·
posed placing the new surface on the entire west hali
of the highway throughout the entire length of the
project, as the safest procedure. Mr. Smith agreed
( R. 581). There were no other routes over which
traffic could be detoured, and a heavy flow of traffic
had to be maintained through the project during re·
surfacing ( R. 578, 583).
The painting of the left turn pockets in the cen·
ter of the highway created special problems and was
more difficult than merely placing a center line on
the highway ( R. 589). The project was not ready for
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complete painting until the day following the accident, and was completed during the following two
days (R. 571).
Although plaintiffs suggest that the road surface was different at the time of the accident than
in November, 1969, (when a co-efficient friction test
was made with the use of a MuMeter), he stated that
the only difference in the surface at the time of the
accident and in November was the normal wear of
traffic ( R. 603) .
(i) Daniel Jackson Faustm<JJn.

Mr. Faustman, a consulting traffic engineer
from Sacramento, California, was called as an expert witness on behalf of the plaintiffs.
Following one visit to the scene of the accident
in the daylight hours, the week preceding trial, he
characterized the conditions as "very hazardous and
misleading" ( R. 618, 645). On cross-examination he
recognized that the science of safety engineering is
primarily a matter of informed judgment ( R. 638).
He agreed that in the circumstances of the present
case there was a basis for a reasonable difference of
opinion as to procedures which were appropriate (R.
638, 640-641). He also acknowledged that his testimony was based in part upon hindsight (R. 641).
(j) Jack Skews.

Mr. Skews, engineer for construction of the
State of Utah, was called on behalf of the State. He
stated that the procedures concerning striping of
highways was generally left to the engineer at the
project level to adapt to "what is considered best for
the conditions that exist" ( R. 675). He testified that
11

the State does not have a standard that fits all situa.
tions and that there was no standard requirement
that the "skin coat" be laid the full width of the road.
way, although there are some projects where such a
procedure is specified. Procedure is generally left to
the best judgment of the project engineer (R. 477).
(k) Paul C. Summers.
Mr. Summers is employed as a materials engi.
neer in the research department of the State of Utah.
He has the specific duty of operating the MuMeter.
This machine is a device for continuously measuring
the coefficient of friction of a road surface (R. 705).
See Exhibit D-85 for a picture of the machine.
He conducted a co-efficient of friction test on
the highway where the accident occurred and founa
the coefficient of friction in the southbound lanes to
be .75, and .81 in the northbound lanes (R. 712).
The witness had examined the specifications for
materials for the bituminous pavement which was
used in resurfacing where the accident occurred. He
had conducted a coefficient of friction test on identi·
cal material within a day or two after the surface
had been placed upon the roadway, and also a week
after the surface was placed. In each instance he
found the co-efficient of friction to be a minimum
of .95 (R. 714).
( 1) Ralph Jackson.

Mr. Jackson is a member of the Highway Patrol,
and was the first officer at the scene of the accident.
He drove through the overhead lights at the checking
station just south of the scene of the accident
722). His later measurements indicated that the acc1•
12

dent occurred 1,250 feet beyond the overhead lights
of the weigh station ( R. 223). Examination revealed
that the lights had some effectiveness 200 feet north
of the last light (R. 224). He had driven over the
road at night on previous occasions while the surface
was being replaced and encountered no difficulty. He
noted a contrast in the color of the very black road
surface with the lighter dirt-gravel shoulder surface,
and the weeds which line the roadway ( R. 726).
Additionally, there was a white wooden fence on the
east side of the highway which extended some distance south of the scene of the accident, which could
be seen without difficulty (R. 727, Ex. P-4, P-55,
P-73).
During the course of the investigation he observed the tire marks left by the Corvair (Batt)
automobile. He noted that the tire marks leading to
the Corvair were continuous and tended to be heavier
or darker on the left side than on the right side ( R.
733). The westerly-most tire mark of the arc left by
the Batt vehicle crossed the skip-line on the west side
of the highway by as much as six inches (R. 734). It
was his opinion that the marks left by the Batt vehicle were "scuff marks" ( R. 735, 743, 751). He also
testified that headlights of a southbound automobile
were plainly visible at night from a point .2 miles
south of the point of the accident to a point .3 miles
north of the accident (R. 737). See plaintiffs' Exhibit 39 for location of test points.
(m) Thonws H. Horracks.

Officer Horracks of the Highway Patrol, also
assisted in the investigation. The marks left by the
13

Batt vehicle were continuous and indicated that tht
car was sliding sideways. The marks were typical
"scuff marks" ( R. 7 59-760). The tire mark off fo
the right side of the road on the east of the highway
appeared to "line up" with the tire marks left by
Batt vehicle.
(n) Charles Arthur Guerts.
Mr. Guerts is the Chief Traffic Engineer for
the State of Utah, Highway Department. He identi·
fied the Maintenance Manual published by the De·
partment (Ex. D-88). Its purpose was to establisn
guide lines, but does not establish a "legal standard"
for the various functions outlined.
The preface to the Manual states:
"The manual is neither designed as, nor
does it establish, a legal standard for these func·
tions.

*

*

*

"Scope: The manual is not a text book; it
is not a substitute for engineering knowledge,
experience or judgment." (Ex. D-88).
Paragraph 13-745.23 deals with painting of
lines on highways. Mr. Guerts indicated that it is the
responsibility of the project engineer to adapt the
provisions of the Manual to the circumstances at
hand (R. 780). In his opinion he believed that all pru·
dent precautions were taken in connection with the
resurfacing project ( R. 794).
( o) Fred R. Wagner.
Professor Fred R. Wagner is a Mechanical En·
gineer with the University of Utah. He also is an in·
14

vestigator for the Department of Transportation,
who has been employed with other experts in various
professions, to study automobile collisions in the
Greater Salt Lake area, for the purpose of assessing
and determining motor vehicle safety standards. The
team does in-depth studies of 30 to 40 accidents per
year ( R. 808). The Salt Lake area team is one of 15
in the United States.
Following a review of all photographs and exhibits, and listening to the testimony of Officer
Allen Gines, the investigating highway patrolman,
he testified concerning the probable movements of
the Batt vehicle prior to the impact ( R. 815-820).
His calculations of speed were based upon the critical
speed scuffs of the Batt vehicle, as explained by Officers Gines, and Jackson, and his own identification
of such scuffs in plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 (R. 822, 858).
Contrary to the appellants' representation at page 15
of their brief, that he was permitted to testify that
speed "caused the accident," he merely testified as
to his opinion of speed based upon all the factors in
evidence. His speed estimates were based upon ( 1)
the radius of the curvature of the tire marks determined from their dimensions as shown by the officers, ( 2) the critical speed scuffs, and ( 3) a coefficient of friction of . 70. He believed that the estimates were accurate to within 5% (R. 834, 841,
855). Depending upon which measurements of the
police officers were used, he arrived at three estimates of speed of the Batt vehicle-84 mph., 72 mph.,
or a minimum of 57 mph. ( R. 834). Assuming that
the Batt vehicle crossed the skip line to the west side
of the highway, thus shortening the radius of the
15

turn, an estimate of 57 mph. resulted. He also ex.
plained that the higher the co-efficient friction, the
higher the speed estimate becomes (R. 835). A
change of 7/100 in the co-efficient of friction affects
the speed 1.6 miles per hour (R. 836, Ex. D-98).
A lengthy examination was conducted by the
plaintiffs' counsel concerning the measurements.
utilized by him in arriving at the speed estimates.
However, he steadfastly maintained that his estimates were sound, based upon the available data,
and that he made several analyses and considered
several alternatives, but his opinion of the probable
movement of the Batt vehicle prior to impact was the
only one consistent with the evidence ( R. 842, 858).

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
ALLOWED THE TESTIMONY OF EXPERT
WITNESS FREDRICK R. WAGNER.
A. The characterization of tire marks as
"critical scuff rrwrks" by witnesses was admis·
sible O'pinion evidence.
Appellants maintain that the trial court incor·
rectly allowed plaintiffs' witness Gines, the investi·
gating officer, to characterize tire marks left by the
Batt vehicle as "critical scuff marks." Also, that the
· use d "looseIy, "
term "critical speed scuff" was b emg
that the officer was allowed to give his opinion on the
basis of tire marks left on the highway concerning
the probable movements of the Batt vehicle, and to
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characterize the tire marks as critical speed scuffs
(Appellants' Brief pp. 18, 21).
A review of the record will reveal that this matter was placed in issue by appellants' counsel through
Officer Gines, when he was asked on direct examination to state his opinion concerning the tire marks of
the Batt vehicle :
"MR. WILCOX:
"Q. Okay, Now, pursuant to this investigation, did you make a determination in your opinion as to whether or not these marks or any of
them were skid marks? That is, locked up brakes
skidding on the surface?
"A. In my opinion counsel, they were not
locked up skid marks . . .
"Q. All right. What would you say these
marks were as you observed them in your opinion?
"A. I would say that these tire marks on
the Hpavement ... here were left on the highway
from this car that came across the highway
either from turning the wheel severely or from
some other thing-some other force you could
do it but turning the wheel, putting the pressure
of the tires down on the pavement as the car
started in an arc like this and it would leave a
mark on the highway where these tires went
across the highway." (R. 338-339).
On cross-examination Officer Gines was asked
to explain the difference between "locked up skid
marks" and "critical curve marks." This was proper
cross-examination and no objection was interposed
to the question. Further, Appellants in effect vouched
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for the officer's expert qualifications by asking his
opinion of the marks on direct examination. They
should not now be heard to complain because the officer gave an answer which didn't satisfy them.
Appellants take no issue with the testimony of
Highway Patrolman Ralph Jackson, one of the investigating officers, who also characterized the tire
marks left by the Batt vehicle as "scuff marks" (R.
733, 735).
Similarly, Professor Wagner explained the tire
marks to be critical speed scuff marks following an
examination of a photograph placed in evidence by
appellants (Ex. 5, R. 837, 858). Appellants did not
introduce a shred of testimony by anyone that the
Batt tire marks were not critical speed scuffs.
In any event, the trial judge did not abuse the
considerable latitude of discretion accorded to him
in passing upon which expert testimony has sufficient credibility and probative value to be helpful in
establishing the facts. Webb vs. Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp., 9 Utah 2d 275, 342P.2d1094.
B. Appellants' objections to Mr. Wagner's
expert opinion go to the weight, and not the admissibility of his testimony.
The appellants claim that Professor Wagner assumed a tire mark configuration which was not in
existence in arriving at the estimated speed of the
Batt vehicle (Appellants' Brief, p. 25). They con·
tend that:
"All of the officers testified that the marks
remained relatively parallel and equadistant to
one another from beginning to end and with no
cross over at the beginning or end of the marks."
18

On direct examination, Officer Gines explained
the configuration of the Batt tire marks in the following language :
A. Yes sir. And as they proceeded north
they did come together at a point on the highway
and as the car started back-started the arc
back from that point then the back tires would
have to cross over the front tires. When you go
like this then you turn and go like this your back
tires don't follow your front tires. They cross
over the lines over the wheels and then you
could see two distinct right wheel marks going
into the point of collision. ( R. 337).

*

*

*

"Q. (By Mr. Wilcox) All right, Officer, as
to the left marks, the ones beginning at point
"B", (Ex. P-39) how would you describe the
relative widths between the left marks as they
proceeded from that point up to the point of
collision?
"A. As I recall, I would say that the left
tire marks were approximately the same as the
right tire marks. You could see two distinct tire
marks on the highway. They proceeded to the
point where it is narrowed down there on the
diagram and then I assume we couldn't pinpoint
it where the back wheels crossed over but they
would have had to have done so for the car to go
to the right again and then you could also see
the two tire marks going into the point of collision." ( R. 338) .
Even a casual observation of Plaintiffs' Ex. 39,
and the measurements made by the officers, will reveal that the tire marks in question were not "parallel
and equadistant" from beginning to end, as claimed
by appellants. The deadly pattern of the tire marks
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conform generally to the probable motion of the Batt
vehicle as illustrated by Professor Wagner's schematic diagram (Exhibit D-93).
Error is also assigned by Appellants because
Professor Wagner assumed in his speed estimates
that the Batt vehicle was not braking immediately
prior to impact.
There was no evidence that the Batt vehicle was
braking. In fact, Gines, plaintiffs' own witness, testified on direct examination that the Batt tire marks
were not skid marks ( R. 338).
Appellants point to a comment made by Professor Wagner, to the effect that he had had discussions
with the investigating officers concerning the critical scuff marks, as error. The investigating officers
had previously testified and described the Batt tire
marks as critical speed scuffs. Counsel had carefully
cross-examined each officer. The matter was cleanly
and clearly in evidence. The fact that he may have
had a discussion with the officers concerning the
same matter does not constitute error.
The opinion was based upon evidence from the
sworn testimony of others as well as his own observa·
tions of the photographs, and falls within the Ian·
guage of State v. Lingman, 96 Utah 180, 91 P.2d 451
( 1939), cited by appellants, requiring expert
to be based on matters observed by the expert or ev1·
dence from the testimony of others.
Further, appellants' counsel made no objection
to the statement, and took no action then, or later
during trial with respect to it. He has raised the mat·
ter for the first time in this appeal.
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Any valid estimate of speed based upon tire
marks on a road surface, must take into account the
co-efficient of friction of the road surface.
The State of Utah placed in evidence the results
of a coefficient of friction test conducted with the
use of a MuMeter (R. 705). A continuous reading of
the very area involved in the accident was made. The
lowest reading was 0.71. Professor Wagner used 0.70
in his calculations. The only difference in the road
surf ace on the day of the accident and the day of the
test was the normal wear of traffic, which would
have the effect of reducing the coefficient of friction
factor. In fact, Witness Summer, a materials engineer in the research department of the State Highway Department, had tested the identical road surface material a day or two and a week after it had
been placed upon the road surface and determined
the coefficient of friction to be a minimum of .95.
Professor Wagner also explained in his testimony
that any increase or decrease of 7/100 in the coefficient of fraction factor directly affects speed estimates by only 1.6 mph. (Ex. 98).
The qualifications of Professor Wagner as an
expert in his field, was never subject to challenge
during trial. In Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 414
P.2d 575, 578 ( 1966), this Court upheld the trial
court's admission of testimony of investigating officers who had testified as to the speed of an automobile calculated from skid marks, in this language:
"If in his judgment the evidence will be of
such assistance, frailities therein which may be
evident from his testimony or from cross-examina tion go to the weight "of this testimony,
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than to its admissibility. The determination made by the trial court should be given some
credit and should not be overturned unless it is
made clearly to appear that he was in error in
his judgment and that it resulted in substantial
prejudice."
In Universal Investment Company v. Carpets,
Inc., 16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P.2d 464, 567 (1965), this
Court made the following statement:
"The opinion of an expert is not rendered
inadmissible because it may be based upon
facts proved by the observation of others. In
many instances, it would be quite impractical
for an expert to have firsthand personal knowledge of all of the facts upon which he bases his
testimony. His opinion may be based upon other
credible evidence which he is willing to accept.
Whatever deficiency, if any there was, in the
fact that Mr. Frank relied in part upon the
statements of others, rather than his own observation, of these draperies at exactly the correct
time, goes to the credibility, but not to the compentency of his testimony."
The trial court, in admitting Professor Wagner's testimony acted within the considerable latitude
of discretion accorded him in passing upon the admissibility of expert testimony. Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094,
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Nelson,
11Utah2d253,358 P.2d81 (1960).
The observations of the court in Carter v. Standard Acc. Insurance Company, 65 Utah 465, 238 P.
259, 276 ( 1925), is apropos here:
"Appellant's counsel had and
widest possible latitude on cross-examination m
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respect to the cause of death as the same
appeared from the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence . . . In these circumstances, even if there had been error in permitting the question, which there was not, the
error would be harmless."
POINT IL THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN GIVING DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 25, AND REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 23,
REGARDING SPEED.
Appellants argue that the Court's Instruction No.
25, does not accurately state the law and the instruction improperly assumed the speed limit to be 40
miles per hour.
Instruction No. 25, is in the language of Jury
Instruction Forms for Utah. The instruction reads
as follows:
"You are instructed that it was the duty of
the driver of the Batt vehicle to drive at such a
speed as was safe, reasonable and prudent under
the circumstances, having due regard to the
width, surface and condition of the highway, the
traffic thereon, visibility, and any actual or potential hazards then existing.
"The designated speed limit for the place in
question was 40 miles per hour. This means that
such speed should ordinarily be regarded as
safe, reasonable and prudent, in the absence of
any special hazards or conditions tendi?g to
make such speed unsafe. But any speed m excess of such designated speed limit would constitute sufficient evidence to permit a finding
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that the speed was greater than was safe, reasonable and prudent, and that such conduct was
negligent." ( R. 142).
The substance of appellants' argument is that
the instruction as given is incomplete. Plaintiffs cite
the case of State v. Lingman, 96 Utah 180, 91 P.2d
451 (1939), for the proposition that an instruction
that speed in excess of 25 miles per hour (the speed
limit) constituted a crime, was reversible error. However, the court in the Lingman case, while establishing that an individual has the right to prove that
speed in excess of a speed limit was "reasonable and
prudent," which right was not precluded by the
Court's Instruction No. 25, was primarily concerned
with the effect of a Salt Lake City ordinance which
made speed in excess of the speed limit negligence per
se. That ordinance, the court said, was in direct conflict with the State statute which made driving at excessive speed prima facie evidence of unlawfulness.
The court in Lingman held that because the ordinance
conflicted with the Utah statute, it was invalid. The
Lingman case involved a criminal charge of involuntary manslaughter arising out of an automobile
collision. The plain holding of the court was that
since the City ordinance was invalid it should not
have been received as evidence.
Instruction No. 25 accurately stated the law.
Clearly, any speed in excess of a designated speed
limit " ... would constitute sufficient evidence to
permit a finding that the speed was greater than was
safe, reasonable and prudent, and that such conduct
was negligent." The instruction does not state that
the jury was required to make a finding that the
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speed was greater than was safe, reasonable and prudent, nor does the instruction in any way direct the
jury to find that excessive speed in this case was
negligence. The instruction merely states that if the
jury finds that the Batt vehicle was traveling faster
than the designated speed limit, then such evidence
would be sufficient to permit a finding that such conduct was negligent. The wording of the instruction
necessarily implies a speed in excess of the posted
speed limit may not constitute negligence if found
to be safe, reasonable and prudent under the circumstances.
To this effect, the court's attention is directed to
the case of Huber v. Scott, 10 P.2d 150, 153 (Cal.
1932). There the court was concerned with an instruction that "speed in excess of 40 miles per hour
shall be taken as prima facie evidence of violation of
the law." Appellant argued that the charge was misleading and erroneous because it failed to state that
excessive speed shall not be taken as "conclusive evidence of a violation of this section." The court stated:
"We think a reasonable construction of the
statute does not warrant this criticism. It has
been repeatedly held that a violation of the statute as it then existed with respect to the limitation of the speed of a motor vehicle on the public
highway is prima facie evidence of negligence
. . . To state that such violation is merely
prima facie evidence of negligence necessarily
infers that it is not conclusive." (Emphasis
added).
Appellants claim that Instruction No. 2.5 was
prejudicial because it prevented them from presenting evidence that speed in excess of the designated
25

speed limit, was safe, reasonable and prudent (App.
Brief pp. 38, 45). However, no tender of evidence
to this effect was made during trial. The argument
is not only without foundation-it is moot.
Appellants cite numerous cases from other jurisdictions in support of their claim that the court's
Instruction No. 25 constituted error. By counsel's
own admission the cases cited recognize that the instructions dealt with in those cases involved instructions to the effect that a violation of the prima facie
speed limit was negligence "per se," or as a "matter
of law" (App. Brief page 42-43). No such instruction was involved in this case.
Appellants also argue that the trial judge improperly assumed the speed on a stretch of highway
where the accident occurred was 40 miles per hour.
The uncontroverted evidence was that the speed in
the area in question was 40 miles per hour. (See
Plaintiffs' Exhibit P-39). Appellants admit that the
impact occurred 200 feet south of a 60 mile per hour
sign, which is in a 40 mile per hour zone (App. Brief
page 45).
In the case of Wells v. Tanner Bros. Contracting
Co., 103 Ariz. 217, 439 P.2d 489, 496-497 ( 1968), it
was argued that the giving of an instruction erroneously fixed the speed limit in a construction zone at
20 miles per hour as a matter of law. In upholding
the instruction, the court said:
"This court has consistently held that facts
established at a trial by uncontroverted evidence
may be
by the
i;i an
without violating the constitut10nal proh1b1t10n
of judicial comment on matters of fact ... Although appellant challenges the posted speed
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limit of 20 miles per hour as being inaccurate,
he does not point to any contradictory evidence
in the record before us. Consequently, we hold
that the trial court did not err in this instruction."
Appellants' argument concerning the issue of
speed, ignores the other claims of contributory negligence set forth in the Court's Instruction No. 23.
That instruction defined the duty of the driver of the
Batt vehicle to drive upon the right half of the road;
to keep a lookout for other vehicles and conditions; to
keep one's car under safe and proper control; not to
attempt to pass another vehicle until it can be done
with safety, and not to follow another vehicle more
closely than is reasonable and prudent. These issues
were properly presented to the jury. Appellants do
not claim that these duties were improperly defined
or supported by the evidence. The jury may have
found the Batt driver negligent for violating any one
of the above standards of conduct. Appellants seem to
assume that the only possibility of contributory negligence was a result of speed. The jury found that negligence on the part of the State of Utah was not a
proximate cause of the accident, and that plaintiffs'
decedents' contributory negligence was the sole proximate cause.
In summary: ( 1) the court's instruction as to
speed correctly stated the law; (2) appellants had
the right and opportunity to present evidence, if any
they had, that speed in excess of the designated speed
limit was safe, reasonable and prudent un<1:er the circumstances, (3) the instruction was supported by the
evidence in the case, and ( 4) the jury's findings that
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the contributory negligence of the driver of the Batt
vehicle was the proximate cause of the accident was
supported by the evidence.
POINT III. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION .
AS TO SPEED OF THE BATT VEHICLE WAS
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.

Appellants' assertion that there was no evidence
that speed proximately contributed to the accident, is '
incredible.
Plaintiffs' witness Van Dell Henderson testified ·
on cross-examination that he was driving 45-50 mph.
when the Batt car pulled along to the side of his car .
just seconds before the accident (R. 314). He may
have been going faster than 50 mph. when he pulled
away from the Batt automobile (R. 315-316). De·:
fendants are entitled to the presumption that the vehicles were traveling at the higher speeds. Alvarado
v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954). Ap· ,
pellants' witness Allen Gines testified to the existence
of approximately 219 feet of critical speed scuff
marks left by the Batt vehicle before impact (Ex. p. ·
39). Another investigating trooper Ralph Jackson,
observed the same marks and identified them as scuff
marks. Professor Fredrick Wagner made detailed
calculations of speed estimates based upon the evi·
dence in the case. The minimum estimated speed was
57 mph.-17 mph. in excess of the posted speed limit
( R. 834). It was properly presented and left to the
jury to determine whether the Batt driver was trav·
eling in excess of the reasonable and safe speed under
1
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the circumstances, and whether such speed contributed to the accident.
Appellants cite the case of Petersen v. Nielsen,
9 Utah 2d 302, 343 P.2d 731 (1959), in support of
their position. There a jury finding was not involved
and the issue before the court concerned inconsistencies between the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions. The only issue was whether speed was the
proximate cause of the accident. The court held that:
"In view of the inconsistency between the
findings made and the conclusions reached by
the trial court, the case is remanded for a new
. 1 ... "
t na
In the present case the jury specifically found
that the Batt driver was guilty of contributory negligence, and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident.
See Weenig v. Manning, 1Utah2d 101, 262 P.2d
491 ( 1953), where it was argued that plaintiff's
speed of 46 to 54 miles per hour could not be found
the proximate cause of a collision with defendant's
car. The argument was rejected. The Court observed
that since under the evidence it could be found that
if plaintiff had been traveling at the maximum safe
speed, and defendant at his admitted speed of 30
miles per hour, there was time and space in which
plaintiff could have avoided the collision by turning
to his right, thus justifying a finding of proximate
cause.
In the instant case, the jury could have found
that had the driver of the Batt vehicle been driving at
a reduced speed, he could have avoided the accident
by turning to the right side of the road. In addition,
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the jury could have properly found that under tht
existing conditions, a safe, reasonable and prudem
speed would have been less than 40 miles per hour.'
the designated speed limit. The issue of proximatt
cause was properly submitted to the jury and their,
finding is fully supported by the evidence.
POINT IV. THE COURT'S
NO. 24, REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' DUTY TO.
OBSERVE LAWFUL SIGNS, WAS NOT ERROR

1

Instruction No. 24 was erroneously read twice;
to the jury. The duplication was withdrawn by the
court pursuant to stipulation of the parties (R. 885).
Even so, the giving of "repetitious instructions does·
not constitute reversible error unless it reasonabl)'
appears that the jury were (sic) misled." Wells t?.
Tanner Brothers Construction Co., 103 Ariz. 217,
439 P.2d 489, 495 ( 1968).
The instruction advised the jury of a driver's
duty to observe and take heed of lawful highway
signs for the safety and guidance of persons using
the highways. The Court, in its Instruction No. 31
(R. 148) defined the duty of Jack B. Parson Con·
struction Company to provide adequate warning to
the public by "signs, barricades, cones or other de·
vices or means of any dangerous condition." Acor·
responding duty on the part of the State of Utah was
explained in Instruction No. 33 ( R. 150).
The duties of the plaintiffs' driver were various·
ly defined by the court in several instructions, includ·
ing the requirement to do or not do what a
ably prudent person would have done under the en··

1
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,
'

'

cumstances (Instruction No. 15, R. 133), the general
duty to keep a proper look out (Instruction No. 23,
R. 140), and the right of the State to assume that a
motorist is possessed of normal faculties of sight,
etc., and that he would use them in exercising reasonable care for his own safety (Instruction No. 28, R.
145), and the presumption of due care based upon
the instinct of self preservation (Instruction No. 34,
R. 151).
This court has continually reiterated the principle that jury instructions should be considered as a
whole in determining their validity and accuracy. In
the recent case of Ewell and Son, Inc., v. Salt Lake
City Corporation, 493 P.2d 1283 (Utah, Feb. 10,
1972), this Court stated:
"As the trial court correctly informed the
jury, no particular instruction or part thereof
should be picked out and considered separately.
They should all be considered together. If when
so considered they give the jury a fair understanding of the issues of fact to be determined
and the law applicable thereto, their purpose is
accomplished. We believe it was in the instant
case; and there is therefore no justification for
upsetting the verdict and judgment merely because plausible arguments as to error can be
made by singling out certain portions of the instructions."
The instructions must be read and understood
together. The special interrogatories answered by the
jury specifically found that the negligence of the
State of Utah was not the proximate cause of the accident. From the jury's answers it is evident that
they fully considered the duties of all parties in rela31

tion to signs. The entire matter was fully presenteu
and argued. However, these issues do not appear to
have been critical factors in the minds of the jun'
because they found that the Parson Constructio;,
Company was not guilty of any negligence. Since
sentially the same duties with respect to signs was
also the responsibility of the State of Utah, it is fair
to assume that the jury did not find against it on thm'
claim.
The jury found that the Batt driver was contrib- ·
utorily negligent, and that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. It follows that even.
if there were a determination that some error was'
committed by the trial court in defining the duties of
the plaintiffs' driver, that appellants' must still fail'
in their effort to overturn the jury verdict, because
negligence of the State of Utah was specifically!
found not to be a proximate cause of the accident.

POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION RELATING TO PROXIMATE CAUSE AND
INTERVENING CAUSE WERE PROPER.
The principle of proximate cause was explained,
to the jury in Instruction No.16, as follows:
"The proximate cause of an injury is that
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, pro·
duces the injury, and without which the resu1t.
would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause
-the one that necessarily sets in operation the
factors that accomplish the injury.
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The term efficient intervening cause as used in
Instruction No. 16 was defined in Instruction No. 17,
in the following language :
"An efficient intervening cause is one
which interrupts the natural sequence of events,
and prevents the natural and probable result of
the original act or omission, and produces a different result by setting in motion the negligent
force that becomes the proximate cause of the
injury, and which could not have been reasonably foreseen."
The above statements of these principles have
been widely used by many courts, including Utah, for
many years. The instructions are contained in Jury
Instruction Forms of Utah. Admittedly many of the
legal concepts presented by the court to a jury of laymen are new. Even so, the elements of causation as
set forth in the two instructions are concise and
simply stated.
The jury in this case returned to the court room
to seek further clarification of the term "proximately" in relation to "proximate cause." The court reread the instruction. The jury foreman then advised
the court that, "Since we had the question, we found
the Instruction. I think we are clear on it now."
When asked if they wished any other instruction, the
jury foreman replied, "No" ( R. 893-894) .
In light of this interesting colloquy between the
court and the jury foreman, it is difficult to attach
much significance to Appellants' claim that this jury
was confused by the instructions. Further evidence
of the sophistication of this jury is found in its application of the principles of causation by referring to
their Answers to the Special Interrogatories ( R. 239-
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They found that the negligence of the State rJI '
Utah v:.-as not the proximate cause of the accidem·
that defendant Parsons Constru.ction Companr wa; ·
not negligent; that the Batt dri\-er \\as
anr;
that his negligence \\-as the proxirnate cause ...\11 theii
answers were fully consistent.
There was sufficient e1,idence \\hich justifieu
the court in gi1,ing the instruction on inteneninue ·
cause.
One of the in1,-estigating police officers plotted ,
the tire marks of both the north-bound Batt car and
the south-bound Grund1,ig '.-ehicle on Exhibit P-39. It
clearly shows that the Grunchig automobile was in 1
the process of turning to its left (east side of thf
highway) just prior to impact. Grund1,ig testified 1
that he sa1,\- the lights of the Batt 1,-ehicle just prior
to impact (R. -151). High\\ay Patrolman Jackson
testified that a car's headlights were clearly Yisible 1
at night from a point .2 miles south of the impact
area to .3 miles north ( R. 737). The jury could hare
found that Gnmd1,ig \\as negligent in failing to ob· ,
se1Te the Batt 1,-ehicle in time to take eYasfre actim1
and pre1,-ent the accident or in turning into the path
of the Batt Yehicle.
In light of the jm·ymen's ans\\ers to the Special
Interrogatories, Appellants' claim that the matter of .
inte1Tening cause was misinterpreted or construed
\Vith respect to contributory negligence, is unfounded..
The jury is presumed to understand and properly ap·
ply the la \Y as stated in the Instructions.
This Court has consistently adhered to the doc· '
trine stated in Simpson l'. Grnaal Jlotors, 24 Utah
2d 301, -170 P.2d 399, -102 ( 1970) :
3-1

"Accordingly, the established rule is that all
presumptions favor the validity of the verdict
and judgment; and they will not be overturned
unless the attacker shows that there is error
which is substantial and prejudicial in the sense
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its
absence the result would have been different."
See also Badger v. C"layson, 18 Utah 2d 329, 422
P.2d 665 ( 1967).
The language of this Court in Ewell and Son,
Inc., vs. Salt Lake City Corporation, 493 P.2d 1283,
(Utah, Feb. 10, 1972), seems pertinent here:
"There is a truism which can be safely indulged: In any lawsuit such as this of several
days' duration, counsel can usually find something to complain of. Nevertheless, when the
parties have had a full and fair opportunity to
present their case, and the jury has rendered its
verdict, and the trial court has entered its judgment thereon, all presumptions favor their validity; and the burden is upon the appellant as
the attacker to show some substantial bases for
upsetting them. It is well established from statute, and by our decisional law that we will not
reverse because of mere error, but only if it is
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that
there is reasonable likelihood that unfairness or
injustice has resulted."
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in permitting the expert witnesses to identify the tire marks of the Batt
vehicle as critical scuff marks, and in receiving opinion testimony from qualified experts concerning
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speed estimates. The trial court was well within the
considerable latitude of discretion accorded him in
passing upon the admissibility of such testimony. The
deficiency, if any, goes to the credibility and not to
the competency of the testimony. The instructions
given relating to speed were proper, and involved
only one claim of contributory negligence alleged by
the defendants, and prove to the satisfaction of the
jury, to be the proximate cause of the accident. In.
structions relating to lookout and causation were
necessary and proper under the evidence of the whole
case.

·
,
·
,

The jury verdict should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted:
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN and
MERLIN R. LYBBERT

Attorneys for Respondent,
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